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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, John Lonkey pied guilty to one count of burglary
and one count of rape. He received an aggregate unified sentence of life, with twentyfive years fixed.

Mr. Lonkey appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction

and asserts that the State breached its obligations under the terms of the plea
agreement when the prosecutor speculated that the victim would probably ask for the
maximum sentence the court could impose.

The State's disavowal of the plea

agreement deprived Mr. Lonkey of his right to due process of law.

Mr. Lonkey also

his sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in his case.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On the night of June 21, 2013, John Lonkey was having car trouble.
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) He knocked on the door of a
closed bar and was admitted into the bar by the bartender, who allowed him to use the
telephone. (PSI, p.3.) While inside the bar, he offered the female bartender $300 in
exchange for sexual intercourse. (PSI, p.3.) After she declined his offer, Mr. Lonkey
then threatened her with a knife and the two engaged in sexual intercourse in the
bathroom of the bar.

(PSI, p.3.)

As he was leaving the bar, Mr. Lonkey took the

cordless phone and broke it. (PSI, p.3.) Based on these facts, Mr. Lonkey was charged
by information with one count of burglary, one count of rape, a deadly weapon
enhancement, and

one count of misdemeanor intentional interference with a

telecommunications device. (R., pp.30-37.)
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Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Lonkey pied guilty

burglary and

in

exchange for which the misdemeanor charge and the deadly weapon enhancement
were dismissed. (11/8/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.20-25, p.8, Ls.14-21; R., pp.42-48.) Pursuant to
the terms of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend an aggregate unified
sentence of no more than forty years, with the sentences to run concurrently. (11/8/13
Tr., p.6, Ls.3-6; R., p.42.) The defense was free to argue for less. (11/8/13 Tr., p.6,
Ls.6-7; R., p.42.)
At his sentencing hearing on January 24, 2014, the victim gave a victim impact
statement.

(1/24/14 Tr., p.5, L.6

p. 7, L.15.)

After the victim's statement, the

prosecution went through all of the aggravating facts, recited the terms of the plea
agreement, and then said, "I think if the victim could articulate some other sentence, she
would ask that there be the absolute maximum imposed and the defendant be directed
to Department of Corrections forthwith. I think that's consistent with my discussions of
her." (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) The State made some additional comments about
the nature of the crime, then asked the district court to sentence Mr. Lonkey to a unified
sentence of forty years, with twenty years fixed. (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.10.)
Mr. Lonkey's counsel asked for five years fixed, plus five years indeterminate, for a
unified sentence of ten years on the burglary charge, and five years fixed, plus ten
years indeterminate, for a unified sentence of fifteen years on the rape charge. (1/24/14
Tr., p.12, Ls.24 - p.31, L.3; R., pp.54-55.)
The district court's sentence far exceeded even the State's recommendation. On
the burglary count, the district court imposed a sentence of ten years, with five years
fixed, and on the rape count, the district court imposed a sentence of life, with twentyfive years fixed.

(1/24/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5; 'R., pp.55, 68-69.)
2

The court ran the

concurrently.

(1/24/14 Tr., p.20, L.3; R., p.69.)

Mr. Lonkey filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.71-74.)
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On February

2014,

ISSUES

1.

Did the State
its obligations under the plea agreement by disavowing the
plea agreement and impliedly recommending a sentence greater than it had
agreed to recommend, thus depriving Mr. Lonkey of his right to due process of
law?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate unified
sentence of life, with twenty-five years fixed, upon Mr. Lonkey following his pleas
of guilty to burglary and rape?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The State Disavowed The Recommendations It Was Obligated To Make Under The
Plea Agreement, Thereby Circumventing And Breaching The Plea Agreement. Thus
Depriving Mr. Lonkey Of His Right To Due Process Of Law

A.

Introduction
The prosecutor in this case had an obligation under the plea agreement to

recommend a sentence of no more than forty years. However, the prosecution made a
lengthy argument as to the aggravating factors present in Mr. Lonkey's case, followed
by a recitation of the plea agreement, but it then speculated that the victim would
probably ask for the maximum sentence (life).

Because the prosecutor severely

undercut the agreed-upon recommendation by implicitly asking the district court to
impose the maximum sentence, the State disavowed the plea agreement and
undermined Mr. Lonkey's plea. Therefore, Mr. Lonkey's sentence should be vacated
and he should be resentenced before another judge.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]hether a plea agreement has been

breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with
contract law standards." State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73 (2005).

C.

The State Breached Its Obligations Under The Plea Agreement When It
Disavowed The Plea Agreement By Impliedly Embracing A Sentencing
Recommending Greater Than It Had Agreed To Recommend, Thus Depriving
Mr. Lonkey Of His Right To Due Process Of Law
Mr. Lonkey asserts that the State breached the plea agreement by effectively

disavowing its agreed upon recommendations and impliedly embracing a much harsher,
5

alternative sentence, one speculatively endorsed by the victim.
, Mr. Lonkey was deprived of his right to due

Due to the State's
of law.

Mr. Lonkey

requests that this matter be remanded for re-sentencing.
The United States Supreme Court has held that plea bargaining is an essential
component of the criminal justice system and that both sides should be held to their
agreement.

Santobe/lo v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971 ).

Without plea

bargaining, the courts would either become overloaded with criminal trials and grind to a
halt, or would have to be expanded many times over. Id. at 261. Plea bargaining is
also desirable because it speeds up criminal cases and leads to their prompt and final
disposition. Id.
"It is well established that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971 )). "This principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and
the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and
intelligent." State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004 ). "If the prosecution has
breached its promise given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was intentional or
inadvertent, it cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, for
the defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false premise." State v. Jones, 139
Idaho 299, 301-302 (Ct. App. 2003)). If "the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise,
[] his conviction cannot stand." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984 ).
Thus, when the prosecution breaches the plea agreement, the defendant is
entitled to relief. Wills, 140 Idaho at 775. As a remedy, the Court may order specific
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performance of the agreement or it may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty
plea. Id.
Further, "[o]ral stipulations of the parties in the presence of the court are
generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or entered on the court
records, and need not be signed by the parties or their attorneys." Conley v. Whittlesey,
126 Idaho 630, 633 (Ct. App. 1995).
In State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 616-618 (1995), the State had agreed to
recommend an indeterminate life sentence in exchange for the defendant's testimony
against a co-defendant, but then, after recommending the indeterminate life sentence,
put in evidence in aggravation. The Idaho Supreme Court held that despite the fact that
the State recommended an indeterminate life sentence as required by the plea
agreement, the evidence in aggravation required resentencing by a different judge. Id.
It held that, "[a]llowing the state to make arguments and introduce the evidence in
aggravation to the extent that was done was reversible error, because it was so
fundamentally at odds with the position the State was obligated to recommend that it
amounted to a violation of the agreement." Id. at 617.
In Jones, supra, the Court of Appeals explained the Lankford holding:
A prosecutor may not circumvent a plea agreement, however,
through words or actions that convey a reservation about a
promised recommendation, nor may a prosecutor impliedly disavow
the recommendation as something which the prosecutor no longer
supports. Although prosecutors need not use any particular form of
expression in recommending an agreed sentence, their overall conduct
must be reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation,
rather than the reverse.
State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 229, 301 (Ct. App. 2003) (quotation marks and citations

omitted).

The Jones Court held that where the State had agreed to recommend

retained jurisdiction, and in fact did so, but then also presented lengthy argument
7

emphasizing the violence of the defendant's offense, the defendant's history of violence,
and

defendant's refusal to take responsibility for his

and implied that it

never would have agreed to the plea agreement had it had full information on the
defendant, the prosecutor "effectively disavowed the recommendation of retained
jurisdiction and advocated a harsher sentence," thereby violating the plea agreement
which necessitated a remand for resentencing. Id. at 303.
In Wills, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that when the prosecutor only
advocates for the agreed upon sentence as a minimum sentence, and further
comments that the recommendation was made with "great restraint," the prosecutor
failed to endorse the recommended terms as the ones the district court should accept.
Wills, 140 Idaho at 776.
Similarly, in State v. Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2004), the Court of
Appeals held that the prosecutor's argument, when taken in context with the entire
proceeding, was fundamentally at-odds with the terms of the plea agreement.

In

Daubs, the prosecutor had agreed to recommend that the district court retain
jurisdiction, but then emphasized that the presentencing investigator had recommended
prison and explained the basis for that recommendation, including the defendant's
crimes, his prior record, and his substance abuse problems. Id. The prosecutor then
introduced the victim's parents, and prefaced their testimony by referring to the "horrific
consequences" of the crime. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he prosecution impliedly
embraced the PSI recommendation, and constructively disavowed its recommendation
of no more than a rider." Id. The Court held that the State failed to fulfill its side of the
bargain and vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different
judge. Daubs, 140 Idaho at 301.
8

In this case, Mr. Lonkey and the State entered into an oral plea agreement where
Mr. Lonkey would enter a guilty plea to burglary and rape and the State agreed dismiss
the misdemeanor and the enhancement, and seek a concurrent sentence on the two
charges, "with an aggregate recommendation of no more than 40 years."

(11/8/13

Tr., p.6, Ls.1-6.) However, at Mr. Lonkey's sentencing, while the State indeed gave lip
service to the plea agreement, the prosecution supposed that the victim would have
wanted the "absolute maximum [sentence] imposed."

(1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-19.)

Further, it presented evidence and argument emphasizing the appalling nature of the
conduct and advocated that Mr. Lonkey should remain incarcerated for a lengthy period
of time. (1/24/14 Tr., p.7, L.17

1

L.2.)

At the sentencing hearing, following the testimony of the victim, the prosecutor
began by stating:

"[y]our Honor, this case represents egregious and appalling and

intentional wanton conduct on the part of the defendant." (1/24/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.)
The prosecutor went on to emphasize Mr. Lonkey's purported denial of this incident, his
lack of remorse and his criminal history in spite of his young age. (1/24/14 Tr., p.9, L.9
- p.11, L.11.) The prosecutor then recommended:
The State's agreed to a 40-year cap.
think if this victim could
articulate some other sentence, she would ask that there be the
absolute maximum imposed and the defendant be directed to
Department of Corrections forthwith. I think that's consistent with my
discussions of her.
The recommendation that the State has under these egregious facts
and circumstances are as follows: We do ask that judgments of
convictions enter as to each of those two felonies. I think this case is
one which calls loudly for the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary
sentence.
And, further, one of the criterion under the code is whether a lesser
sentence would be appropriate and otherwise would minimize the
significance of this offense. The State's recommendations in keeping with
what was negotiated by way of resolution in this matter is for a period of
9

twenty
fixed
indeterminate.
4 Tr., p.11, L.16

penitentiary, followed by twenty

·1

L.10 (emphasis added).)

The State then

concluded its statements by saying:
From the State's perspective, this defendant poses a great danger to other
females and women in this community. A lengthy period of incarceration
is required to address the severity of these offenses.
(1/24/14 Tr., p.13, L.25

p.14, L.4.)

As such, the prosecutor's comments were fundamentally at odds with the State's
promised recommendation, and although the prosecutor uttered the recommendation
required by the plea agreement, his other statements effectively disavowed that
recommendation and affirmatively advocated a harsher sentence.

Implicitly, the

prosecutor asked for a life sentence.
Just as was the case in Jones and Daubs, here the prosecutor failed to live up to
his obligations under the plea agreement. Here, like in Daubs, the State paid but "brief
lip service" to the agreed-upon sentence, and impliedly endorsed a fictional
recommendation by the victim of the maximum sentence.

When the State impliedly

embraced the victim's fictional recommendation, it constructively disavowed the
recommendation it had agreed to make in exchange for Mr. Lonkey's guilty plea.
Further, like in Daubs, the state emphasized the "egregious facts and circumstances"
present in this case and told the district court that "this case is one which calls loudly for
the imposition of a lengthy penitentiary sentence." (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.2.)
The prosecutor's conduct in disavowing and breaching the plea agreement entered into
by Mr. Lonkey, whereby Mr. Lonkey waived numerous State and Federal Constitutional
rights, is appalling under any view of the case. Therefore, under Jones and Daubs, the
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prosecutor's conduct constituted a breach of the plea

necessitating

resentencing by a different district court judge.

D.

The State's Breach Of The Plea Agreement Constituted Fundamental Error
Even though Mr. Lonkey did not object at the sentencing hearing, this Court is

able to review the issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
209, 226 (2010). To show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the
alleged error:

"(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional

rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome
of the trial proceedings." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho
368, 371 (Ct. App. 2011 ), rev. denied. The record in this case demonstrates that the
breach of plea agreement was a fundamental error under the Perry test.

1.

The Error Violated Mr. Lonkey's Constitutional Right To Due Process

Mr. Lonkey's due process right was violated when the prosecution breached the
plea agreement. When a plea agreement relies on a promise of the prosecutor as part
of the inducement or consideration, the prosecutor must fulfill his promise.

Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775 (Ct. App. 2004 ).

State v.

"This principle is derived from the Due

Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both
voluntary and intelligent." Id.
In Idaho, pre-Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals
repeatedly held that the breach of a plea agreement constituted fundamental error.
See, e.g., State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74 (2005) (holding that claim of state's breach of
plea agreement goes to the foundation or basis of the defendant's rights and, therefore,
11

constitutes fundamental error such that it may be reviewed for the first time on appeal);

v. Allen, 1

Idaho 267, 271

(Ct App. 2006) (holding that state's breach of the

plea agreement constituted fundamental error and, therefore, issue may be raised for
the first time on appeal).
After Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 256
(2012), held that the breach of a plea agreement still constitutes fundamental error. In
that case, the Court recognized that a breach of the plea agreement violated the
defendant's unwaived constitutional right:
Although the analogy may not hold in all respects, plea bargains are
essentially contracts. When the consideration for a contract fails-that is,
when one of the exchanged promises is not kept-we do not say that the
voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never existed, so that it is
automatically and utterly void; we say that the contract was broken.

Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009)). Further, a claim that
the State breached a plea agreement affects whether the agreement was knowingly or
voluntarily entered into, thus it "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights."

Id. (quoting State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho at 74). The Idaho Supreme Court adopted the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Puckett, and held that, "[i]f the State
breached the plea agreement, the breach would go to the foundation of Gomez's
rights." Gomez, 153 at 256.
A plea agreement is essentially a contract.

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137.

See

State v. Ruthetford, 107 Idaho 910, 913 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a defendant has a
right analogous to a contract right once a plea bargain is entered); see also United

States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying contract law standards to plea
bargain agreements).

However, "a plea agreement is more than a mere contract

between two parties and 'must be attended by constitutional safeguards to ensure that a
12

defendant receives the performance

he is due."' Craig v. Colorado, 986 P.2d 951,

961 (Colo. 1999) (quoting People v. McCormick, 859 P.2d 846, 856 (Colo. 1993)).
Since a guilty plea waives certain constitutional rights, when the State breaches
a promise made to the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea, the defendant is
constitutionally entitled to relief. Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 913.
In this case, Mr. Lonkey contracted with the State. Mr. Lonkey agreed to enter a
plea of guilty, thus eliminating the expense of a trial to the State and the emotional
burden on the victim. In exchange for Mr. Lonkey's waiver of his constitutional rights,
the State would cap its recommendation at 40 years. The State violated this agreement
by offering the district court an alternative to the sentence it was obligated to
recommend-speculation that the victim would have wanted the maximum possible
sentence-thus disavowing the recommendation it had promised to make.
Due to the State's implied request for the maximum possible sentence at the
sentencing hearing, Mr. Lonkey was deprived of his right to due process of law
guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. As such,
the sentence violated Mr. Lonkey's unwaived constitutional right to due process. Thus,
the first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

2.

The Violation Of Mr. Lonkey's Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious
From The Record

Further, the error is clear or obvious.

The record is clear that the State

disavowed the plea agreement immediately after it recited the agreed upon sentence by
advising the district court that the victim would have probably asked that the maximum
sentence be imposed upon Mr. Lonkey. (1/24/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-21.) Further, this was
not a tactical decision by Mr. Lonkey's counsel.
13

There is no strategic advantage to

permitting the State to advocate in favor of the maximum possible sentence,
where the defendant waived all of his constitutional rights in exchange for a
that the State would advocate for a lesser sentence. The State's disavowal of the plea
agreement is a clear and obvious violation of Mr. Lonkey's right to due process. As
such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

3.

The District Court's Error Presumably Affected The Outcome Of The Case

Because Mr. Lonkey may have received a longer sentence because the State
disavowed the plea agreement by impliedly asking for the maximum sentence, the
violation of his rights likely affected the outcome of his case.

Indeed, instead of

following the recommendations called for under the terms of the plea agreement, the
district court sentenced Mr. Lonkey to the maximum possible sentence for rape-life in
prison-which also happens to be the sentence implicitly recommended by the
prosecutor.
Further, had Mr. Lonkey known that the State would not honor its agreement to
cap the sentencing recommendation at forty years; he may not have agreed to plead
guilty to the charges.
The record is clear that the plea agreement called for a recommendation by the
State of no more than forty years. The record is also clear that the State circumvented
the plea agreement by telling the district court a different sentence that the State
supposedly believed the victim would have wanted. Thus, the third prong of the Perry
test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
Because the State's breach of the plea agreement constituted a fundamental
error, this Court should vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing
hearing.
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Unified
Sentence Of Life 1 With Twenty-Five Years Fixed 1 Upon Mr. Lonkey Following His Plea
Of Guilty To Burglary And Rape
Mr. Lonkey asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of life,
with twenty-five years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Lonkey does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Mr. Lonkey must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives
of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Lonkey's sentence is
excessive. The district court failed to consider the fact that Mr. Lonkey was previously
successful on probation and that, with programming and supervision, Mr. Lonkey could
likely be successful in the community.

(See PSI, p.10.)
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Notably, Mr. Lonkey had

successfully completed his probationary term for his juvenile case; he met with his
probation officer as scheduled and attended treatment. (PSI, p.10.)
One important matter that should have received the attention of the district court
is that Mr. Lon key has the support of his family members. See State v. Shideler, 103
Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of his
family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho
348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) (reducing sentence of first-time offender who had a family
depending upon him for support and who accepted responsibility for the offense at
issue), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990).
Mr. Lonkey has a good relationship with his mother, and he is also close with his
brother and sister.
(PSI, p.11.)

(PSI, p.11.)

Mr. Lonkey's mother is very supportive of her son.

She is aware that Mr. Lonkey has mental health issues, and she has

attempted to get Mr. Lonkey the treatment he needs since approximately age eight.
(PSI, p.11.)

She told the presentencing investigator that Mr. Lonkey does well in a

structured environment, and implied that supervised probation would be good for
Mr. Lonkey. (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Lonkey's family is very important to him-he is close to his
siblings and his mother. (PSI, pp.11, 16.)
Another mitigating factor the district court failed to fully consider was the fact that
Mr. Lonkey was remorseful, and expressed his regret regarding his conduct. (See, e.g.,
PSI, pp.5-6, 17.) Mr. Lonkey wrote to the court, "I'm completely confused on why I did it
and totally ashamed." (PSI, p.6.) Further, Mr. Lonkey knew he had done something
wrong and took responsibility for his wrongful conduct by pleading guilty to the offense.
(11/8/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.14-21; PSI, pp.5, 17.)
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The
been

of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has
in several cases.

For example, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204

(Ct. App. 1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when
the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem,
his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. at
209.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant's term of imprisonment
because the defendant expressed regret for what he had done.

In Shideler, Idaho

Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and
physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse,
coupled with his remorse for his actions, was so compelling that it outweighed the
gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession
of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the

court reduced Shideler's sentence from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty
years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve years. Id. at 593.
Additionally,

Mr.

Lonkey

suffers

from

depression

and

Attention

Deficit

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). (PSI, pp.9, 13-15.) He has also been diagnosed with
oppositional defiant disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, antisocial personality
disorder and schizoid typal personality disorder.

(PSI, p.13.)

Mr. Lon key has been

taking medication for his mental health issues since approximately age eight, but he
started seeing a counselor at age five. (PSI, p.14.) Due to his mental health issues,
Mr. Lonkey tends to isolate himself from others. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Lonkey has attempted
suicide in the past.

(PSI, pp.8-9.)

As such, Mr. Lonkey's mental condition, when
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sufficiently considered, indicates that a more lenient

Hollon v. State, 1

Idaho

was appropriate.

581 (1

Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Lonkey asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts
that had the district court properly considered his family support, remorse, and mental
health issues it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Lonkey respectfully asks this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand this
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing, in front of a different district
judge, with instructions that the State specifically recommend a sentence that strictly
adheres to the plea agreement. Alternatively, Mr. Lonkey respectfully requests that this
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1ih day of August, 2014.

SALLY,1. COOLEY
Deputy State Appell le Public Defender
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